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For the past two decades, the police in the United Kingdom have recorded non-crime hate 
incidents. Defined broadly as non-crime incidents which is perceived by the victim or any 
other person to be motivated by hostility or prejudice against a person who is a member 
of a protected group, the practice of recording such incidents, and the use of  the so-called 
‘perception test’ or ‘Macpherson test’, have been recognised internationally as crucial to 
combating hate crime. The European Council on Racism and Intolerance’s General Policy 
Recommendation 11 regarding the role of the police in combating racist offences and 
monitoring racist incidents in the, include a recommendations that a system for recording 
and monitoring racist incidents be put in place, and that the perception test to be used in 
this regard. Having operated relatively unproblematically, both the recording of non-
crime hate incidents, and the perception test, were put under scrutiny by the High Court 
recently. This article will consider the potential impact of the decision in R (Miller) v 
College of Policing and Chief Constable of Humberside1 with respect to such incidents, 
particularly in the context of the recording of non-crime transphobic (hate) incidents. The 
decision has the capacity not only to impact on, and inform, not just policy and practice 
in England and Wales, but across the UK and Europe, where the test has been adopted 
and adapted. 
The Hate Crime Operational Guidance  
The recording of non-crime hate incidents, and definitions associated with such 
recording, was based on recommendations made in the Macpherson report, published in 
the aftermath of the murder of Stephen Lawrence in London.2 The Report observes that 
the failure to recognise the central place that race and race relations should have played 
in the investigation of the murder played a part in the policing deficiencies under scrutiny 
in the Report.3 A result of what the Report calls ‘institutional racism’,4 this failure 
underpinned the investigation, and, in this context, the particular failure of many police 
officers to recognise Stephen Lawrence’s murder as a racially motivated crime.5 In order 
 
1 [2020] EWHC 225. 
2 William Macpherson, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Cm 4262-I, The Stationery Office 1999) 
3 ibid para 6.21. 
4 The Inquiry defined institutional racism as ‘The collective failure of an organisation to provide an 
appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be 
seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting 
prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.’ 
William Macpherson, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Cm 4262-I, The Stationery Office 1999) para 6.34. 
5 ibid para 6.45. 
to mitigate against institutional racism impacting on the investigation or prosecution of 
a crime in the future, the Macpherson Inquiry recommended the adoption of a definition 
of a racist incident to be used across policing practices: 
 
‘A racist incident is any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or 
any other person.’6 
 
Importantly, the Inquiry recommends that the definition be inclusive of crimes and non-
crimes, and that both ‘must be reported, recorded and investigated with equal 
commitment.’7 Though the definition has been changed following the publication of the 
Report, the essence of its requirements remain the same: that it is a victim-oriented 
definition which requires the incident to be recorded as racist where it is perceived by 
the victim or any other person to be so motivated. This position is now supported and 
adopted by the European Commission on Racism and Intolerance, which in its General 
Policy Recommendations 11 on combating racism and racial discrimination in policing, 
defines a racist incident as ‘any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or 
any other person.’8 Thus, there are two elements to the recording of non-crime hate 
incidents. First, what occurred should qualify as a non-crime incident. The definition of a 
non-crime hate incident is set out in the Hate Crime Operational Guidance published by 
the College of Policing as: 
 
‘any non-crime incident which is perceived by the victim, or any other person, to 
be motivated (wholly or partially) by a hostility or prejudice..’9 
 
The second requirement is that the victim or some other person must have perceived the 
non-crime incident to be motivated by prejudice or hostility. Again, the Hate Crime 
Operational Guidance (HCOG) sets out the perception test: 
 
‘For recording purposes, the perception of the victim, or any other person (see 
1.2.4 Other person), is the defining factor in determining whether an incident is a 
hate incident, or in recognising the hostility element of a hate crime. The victim 
does not have to justify or provide evidence of their belief, and police officers or 
staff should not directly challenge this perception. Evidence of the hostility is not 
required for an incident or crime to be recorded as a hate crime or hate incident.’10 
 
The recording of non-crime hate incidents, and indeed the validity of the perception test 
more generally, were considered in the recent decision of Miller. Given the recent 
 
6 ibid chapter 47, para 12. 
7 ibid chapter 47, para 13. 
8 European Commission on Racism and Intolerance, ECRI General Policy Recommendation Number 11: 
Combating racism and racial discrimination in policing (ECRI 2007). 
9 College of Policing, Hate Crime Operational Guidance (College of Policing 2014), 60. 
10 College of Policing, Hate Crime Operational Guidance (College of Policing 2014), 5. 
recommendations of the Law Commission to extend the protection of hate crime 
legislation to a broader set of protected groups, the manner in which hate crime will be 
recorded for both hate crimes and non-crime hate incidents now requires scrutiny in the 
context of Miller. 
The Decision in Miller 
Miller was a decision of the High Court in 2020. Miller made a number of tweets which 
Mrs B reported to the police as she considered them offensive and transphobic.11 The 
police recorded the tweets as a non-hate crime incident as per the Hate Crime Operational 
Guidance on what was simply described by the Court as the relevant computer system.12 
In doing so, the police created a Crime Report Print, in which Mrs B was referred to as the 
victim, and Miller as the suspect. Further, the Court noted, the matter was so recorded on 
the ‘say so of Mrs B and without any critical scrutiny of the tweets or any assessment of 
whether what she was saying was accurate.’13 Mrs B in her statement said that the 
comments made by Miller on his twitter account ‘are designed to cause deep offence and 
show his hatred for the transgender community.’14 In response, the Court stated: 
 
‘[T]here was no evidence that the tweets were ‘designed’ to cause deep offence, 
even leaving aside the Claimant’s evidence about his motives. Mrs B’s report was 
inaccurate. The tweets were not directed at the transgender community. They 
were primarily directed at the Claimant’s Twitter followers … It can be assumed 
that the Claimant’s followers are broadly sympathetic to his gender critical views, 
as are those others who read his tweets.’15  
 
The investigating officer noted in his statement that when an hate incident is assigned to 
him, he first ensures that it has been correctly classified (and, for example, should not be 
classified as a hate crime). Where he is happy that the classification is accurate, he ‘at a 
bare minimum … would speak to people involved.’16 Following a review of the tweets in 
the case, that while there was no criminal offence, he was satisfied that ‘there was a 
perception by the victim that the tweets were motivated by a hostility or prejudice 
against transgender people.’17 Having reviewed the tweets, he decided that given the 
impact on Mrs B, and the risk of matters escalating to criminal offences, he should speak 
with Miller. In response to this, the Court notes: ‘PC Gul does not say what criminal 
offences he had in mind or why he thought there was a “risk”.’18 PC Gul went to Miller’s 
place of work to discuss the issue with him, and as he was not there, left his card, after 
 
11 Some of the tweets are reproduced in the judgment at [2020] EWHC 225, [24], [26], [28], [30], [32], [34], 
[36], [39], [40], [42], [44], [46], [48], [50], [52], [54], and [56].  
12 [2020] EWHC 225, para [69]. 
13 ibid, para [70]. 
14 ibid, para [16]. 
15 ibid, para [74]. The Court gives no definition as to the term ‘gender critical views’.  
16 ibid, para [76]. 
17 ibid, para [77]. 
18 ibid, para [80]. 
which Miller phoned him. There was a disagreement between the evidence of PC Gul and 
that of Miller as to the content of the conversation which took place between them when 
they talked on the phone. However, the court made a number of findings of fact as to what 
occurred: 
 
(a) PC Gul visited the Claimant’s place of work in his capacity as a police officer, 
albeit he did not think he was exercising any powers of a police officer;  
(b) he left a message requesting that the Claimant contact him;  
(c) they subsequently spoke on the telephone;  
(d) during that call PC Gul misrepresented and/or exaggerated the effect that the 
Claimant’s tweets had had and the number of complaints the police had received;  
(e) PC Gul warned the Claimant that if he ‘escalated’ matters then the police might 
take criminal action;  
(f) he did not explain what escalation meant;  
(g) ACC Young (who made a public statement following the issuance of a complaint 
from Miller and media attention regarding same) also publicly referred to 
escalation;  
(h) when the Claimant complained, the police responded by again referring to 
escalation and criminal proceedings. 
 
The Court specifically found as a matter of fact that the only people who definitely read 
the tweets were Mrs B and the friend who told her about them; and that the only person 
who complained to the police was Mrs B. The court also found that the effect of the 
conversation between Millar and PC Gul was that Miller had been warned not to exercise 
his freedom of expression in relation to ‘transgender issues’. 
 
The Court highlighted that tweets are, for the purposes of the Communications Act 2003, 
messages sent over a public electronic communications network.19 The tweets published 
by Miller were not directed at Mrs B, and indeed was of the view that they were not 
directed at anyone in particular. The Court is at pains at various points in the judgment 
to note that there is no evidence to support an assertion that the tweets from Miller upset 
members of the trans community. An example of such a statement from the Court is: 
‘There is certainly no evidence that before Mrs B became involved anyone found the 
tweets offensive or indecent or in any way remarkable. They were merely moments lost 
in the Twittersphere.’20 This is an issue that the Court returns to time and again during 
the course of its judgment, placing considerable emphasis on the fact that, as only one 
member of the transgender community reported the tweet, there was no evidence that 
the tweet had upset any other members of the community.  
 
 
19 Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] 1 WLR 1833. Section 127(1)(a) of that Act makes it 
an offence to send via such a network ‘a message or other matter that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, 
obscene or menacing character’. 
20 [2020] EWHC 225, para [59]. 
It was argued on behalf of Miller that both Hate Crime Operational Guidance and the 
actions of the Humberside Police were unlawful because (1) the principle of legality was 
violated, due to the absence of a statutory authorisation for the infringement of Miller’s 
freedom of expression and/or that said interference was disproportionate; (2) the 
interference with Article 10 was not ‘prescribed by law’ as per the requirements of Article 
10; and/or (3) such an interference is not necessary in a democratic society as is required 
by Article 10(2). Counsel also noted that operation of the so-called perception test was 
particularly egregious in the context of any such incident being included on Enhanced 
Criminal Record Certificates, which would potentially have consequences for future 
employment. In response, the College of Policing refuted those claims made by Miller, 
arguing that there was no violation of Miller’s freedom of expression, and if there was, it 
was done so in compliance with Article 10 as a proportionate measure. It noted 
particularly that the record created has no consequence for Miller given the fact that 
recording is an administrative process associated with an intelligence function and has 
no sanction associated with it, and that there is no realistic possibility that the record 
would be disclosed. For the police, similar arguments were made, and it was further 
argued that the ‘significant impact’ that Miller argued the procedure had on his life, when 
subject to careful analysis, was ‘unrealistic, exaggerated and/or caused by the Claimant’s 
own actions rather than the fact of recording.’21 Both defendants noted that the recording 
of the non-crime hate incident had absolutely no chilling effect on the claimant, and he 
had continued tweeting as he had been previously. He further rejected the argument that 
what Miller had engaged in was political speech, but instead argued that it was a 
‘“vehement attack” on the legitimacy of transgenderism as a concept.’22 Indeed, he noted 
that less protection is afforded to expression which is ‘abusive or attacking toward a 
group sharing a characteristic protected by Article 14 ECHR/Equality Act 2010.’23 The 
contact between Miller and PC Gul were, he argued ‘a discrete and separate decision to 
that being challenged.’24  
 
Considering the lawfulness of HCOG at common law, Knowles J found that recording and 
retaining data is a power held by the police at common law, and that there is no need for 
a statutory authorisation for same where the data is collected in a non-intrusive way – 
even where the collection and retention of such data interferes with Convention rights. 
Knowles J stated clearly that collecting details of ‘hate crimes and non-crime hate 
incidents forms one aspect of the police’s common law duty to keep the peace and to 
prevent crime, and is lawful on that basis.’25 In his consideration of the relevance of the 
principle of legality to the case, Knowles J was clear that that principle – at least in the UK 
– is simply a tool of statutory interpretation. The broader impact of the decision with 
 
21  ibid, para [147]. 
22  ibid, para [149]. 
23  ibid. 
24  ibid, para [147]. 
25 ibid, para [162]. 
respect to police recording practices, the perception test, and policing practices will now 
be considered. 
Article 10-compliant police recording practices  
Ultimately, the Court found that HCOG was Article 10 compliant. However, this finding 
was based on a narrow interpretation of HCOG, and did not extend to confirming that any 
recording of non-crime hate incidents was Article 10 compliant. Rather than rehearse the 
reasoning of the Court, it is perhaps more useful at this point to outline what Knowles J 
found ensured that HCOG was Article 10 compliant. First, he stated, the act of recording 
should have no ‘formality, condition, restriction or penalty’ associated with it. There 
should be no consequences arising out of the act of recording for the individual about 
whom the record relates to. Any action which arises from the recording of such 
information is an operational decision made by the police, and a decision to act upon the 
record should be made in a manner which is compliant with the common law and 
statutory powers of the police. 
 
Second, the recording of a non-crime hate incident should not be subject to a disclosure 
on a criminal record check of the individual to whom the record relates, such as a criminal 
record certificate or an Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate (ECRC). Thus, if the record 
is made and held on the Police National Computer in the UK, which would result in 
disclosure as part of a criminal record certificate, then the practice would not be Article 
10 compliant. The Court was of the view that any disclosure of such information would 
not be made due to HCOG, but rather would be made as a result of the rules regarding 
disclosure, which are set out in statutory form and have been upheld as human rights 
compliant. HCOG, as the Court noted ‘does not require any particular operational 
response to the recording of a non-crime hate incident.’26 That said, the Court also found 
that disclosure is permissible: 
 
‘where the need to protect the public is at its greatest, ie, where the individual may 
be in contact with vulnerable individuals and, because of the rest of relevance, 
where those vulnerable individuals may belong to the group against whom it is 
complained the applicant was hostile.’27 
 
An important safeguard here with reference to ECRC disclosures, Knowles J found, is that 
an applicant may request to have the information that is held on them removed from the 




26 ibid, para [183]. 
27 ibid, para [236]. 
Third, any recording practice should be publicly accessible, and fall within a statutory or 
common law power of the police to ‘collect, use, retail and disclose information, for the 
purposes of preventing and detecting crime.’28  
Article 10-compliant perception test 
The Court found that the perception-based test did not contravene the principle of 
foreseeability which is a requirement of Article 10, because if someone ‘behaves in a way 
which carries the possibility that another person may subjectively conclude that it 
exhibits non-criminal hostility or prejudice in relation to one of the five protected strands 
then it will be recorded.’29 The Court continued: 
 
‘[A] reasonable reader of HCOG would be able to foresee, with a reasonable degree 
of certainty (and with advice if necessary), the consequences of making a given 
statement, precisely because any statement that is reported as being motivated by 
hostility towards one of the monitored strands is to be recorded as a non-crime 
hate incident. Those who exercise their freedom of speech in a way that may come 
to the attention of the authorities via a complaint will generally have a pretty good 
idea of their motivation, and whether it is foreseeably going to be interpreted by 
others as motivated by hostility or prejudice. In my judgment it is sufficiently 
certainly the case that perception based reporting does not render HCOG 
uncertain.’ 
 
What is not clear, however, is what Knowles J believed was the threshold for recording of 
a non-crime hate incident. Are the two – that is, the ‘hate’ element, on the one hand, and 
the non-crime incident element on the other – to be recorded based on the perception of 
the victim? Is every incident – no matter how mundane or vexatious, and no matter how 
far removed from policing practices – to be recorded, or does the ‘non-crime incident’ 
need to pass a certain threshold of seriousness for the incident to be recorded? On this, 
the National Standard for Incident Recording issued by the Home Office is instructive.30 
 
Further, it was commonly understood that the perception test required that the crime be 
so recorded once the victim was of the view that the crime was hate motivated, and that 
there was no discretion on the part of the police in this regard. However, Knowles J gave 
an example which seems to indicate that he is of the view that such an absolute approach 
to recording would be inappropriate: 
 
‘Suppose, for example, that a fat and bald straight non-trans man is walking home 
from work down his quiet residential street when abuse is shouted at him from a 
passing car to the effect that he is fat and bald. If that person went to the police 
 
28 ibid, para [191]. 
29 ibid, para [196]. 
30 See below for discussion. 
and said the abuse were based on hostility because of transgender [sic] it cannot 
be the case that HCOG would require it to be recorded as such as a non-crime hate 
incident when there is nothing in the facts which remotely begins to suggest that 
was any connection with that protected strand. Vitally important though the 
purposes which HCOG serves undoubtedly are, it does not require the police to 
leave common sense wholly out of account when deciding whether to record what 
is or is not a non-crime hate incident.’31 
 
In support of this assertion, Knowles J relied on statements from two witnesses for the 
defence which indicates that there is some discretion as to whether to record the incident 
or not.32 Again, however, it is unclear whether this finding relates to discretion with 
reference to the recording of non-crime incidents, or whether he believes such a ‘common 
sense approach’ should be taken to the operation of the perception test, or both. 
Article 10-compliant policing practices 
As well as considering the lawfulness of HCOG, Knowles J assessed the lawfulness of 
police practices when recording non-crime hate incidents. Insight can be gleaned here 
from what he considered acceptable from an Article 10 perspective concerning the 
manner in which police services operationalise HCOG, or follow up on a report made to 
them which is recorded as a non-crime hate incident. Thus, although HCOG itself was 
Article 10 compliant, the question was whether the police service breached Miller’s 
Article 10 rights when exercising their operational discretion under HCOG. 
 
Knowles J found that the actions of PC Gul amounted to an interference with Miller’s 
Article 10 rights. It seems that the following aspects of his treatment collectively 
amounted to an interference with Miller’s Article 10 rights: 
 
- PC Gul went to Miller’s place of work; 
- He misstated the facts of the case to Miller in his conversation (exaggerating the 
effect of the tweets and the number of complaints made); 
- He warned Miller that if matters escalated he would be subject to prosecution; 
- Miller was subject to further warnings by the police to the effect that if he 
continued to tweet, he would be at risk of criminal prosecution; 
- The term escalation was never explained to Miller. 
 
In later statements Knowles J emphasised two aspects of the treatment: the warning of 
criminal prosecution, and the fact that PC Gul visited Miller’s place of work: 
 
 
31 ibid, para [203]. 
32 Some would argue that the entire purpose of the perception test is to circumvent the use of discretion on 
the part of potentially biased agents of the State.  
‘There was not a shred of evidence that the Claimant was at risk of committing a 
criminal offence. The effect of the police turning up at his place of work because of 
his political opinions must not be underestimated. To do so would be to 
undervalue a cardinal democratic freedom. In this country we have never had a 
Cheka, a Gestapo or a Stasi. We have never lived in an Orwellian society.’33 
 
Thus, to operationalise HCOG in a manner which is compliant with Article 10, it is clear 
that the police should not threaten the individual with criminal prosecution (or perhaps 
even mention criminal prosecution), and if they need to speak with the individual, they 
should restrict themselves to visiting the individual at their home, or at another neutral 
venue. That said, later, Knowles J considered this response in the context of whether it 
was proportionate: he noted that given the ‘importance of not restricting political debate’, 
turning up to the workplace of Miller and warning him about criminal prosecution was 
not a proportionate – that is, a rational or necessary – response. Thus, it is unclear 
whether the response of the police was unlawful per se, or unlawful in the context of the 
speech being specially protected political speech.   
 
Further, Knowles J highlighted the fact that a Crime Report was created which referred 
to the Claimant as a suspect. Thus, again, in order to operationalise HCOG, where a crime 
report is made, such loaded terms should not be used.  
 
In making a decision to record a report under HCOG, Knowles J stated the police should 
be clear that the incident involved hostility or prejudice. He was of the view that there 
should be some ‘rationality’ to the belief of the individual reporting the incident that it 
involved prejudice or hostility before the incident was recorded. Police officers should, in 
line 1.2.4 of HCOG, carefully consider whether the individual reporting (Mrs B in this 
case) were doing so in response to a media story, or for political purposes, categories he 
felt Mrs B might fall into. It further seems from Knowles J’s opinion that in deciding 
whether or not to record (at least tweets) as non-crime hate incidents, both the number 
of complaints made in relation to the tweets, and the accuracy of the statement of the 
individual recording should be considered. That said, Knowles J did not give any advice 
as to how an individual police officer can assess whether any incident has been the 
subject of other reports across the United Kingdom, an issue which particularly applies 
to incidents that occur online. 
Discussion: Recording non-crime hate incidents, and perceptions of 
transphobia 
A number of issues arise in this case: the first is the legitimacy of the ‘perception test’, 
which was incorporated into policing practices as one of the outcomes from the 
Macpherson report. The second aspect is the recording of non-crime incidents on the 
 
33 ibid, para [259]. 
police recording systems and the manner in which such non-crime incidents are 
recorded. The third aspect is the elevation of speech which concerns trans people’s lives 
to ‘specially protected’ speech for the purposes of Article 10.  
 
In analysing the judgment, first, it seems from the decision that Knowles J is of the view 
that, in order to operationalise the perception test in a manner consistent with Article 10, 
the police need to ensure that there is a ‘rationality’ to the belief of the individual 
reporting that the incident in fact involved prejudice or hostility. It is not clear how this 
‘rationality’ should be determined but at first glance, it does appear that some level of 
investigation needs to take place prior to any determination being made that the 
perception is rational. Indeed, Knowles J explicitly states: ‘I am prepared to accept that 
Mrs B had the perception that the tweets demonstrated hostility or prejudice to the 
transgender community.’34 Knowles J’s position which seems to require rationality is, I 
believe, contrary to the underlying philosophy and justification for the perception test, 
and how it has operated since its inception.  
 
Second, whilst it is important that the views of the victim are considered in the context of 
whether the incident involved prejudice or hostility, this does not absolve the police 
service from their usual functions of recording the incident. The National Standard for 
Incident Recording (NSIR) issued by the Home Office sets out the key principles, 
activities, and behaviours to support ‘effective contact management service delivery.’35 
There is clear guidance in the NSIR on what to record in an incident report. An incident 
is defined in the report as ‘A single distinct event or occurrence which disturbs an 
individual’s, group’s or community’s quality of life or causes them concern.’36 This is 
evidently a very low standard, significantly lower than a criminal offence. Effective risk 
management, NSIR states, involves the ‘identification, assessment and prioritisation of 
risks.’37 In managing incidents, NSIR states, the aim is to restore situations to normality 
with minimal impact, which involves ‘initial support followed by investigation; analysis 
and diagnosis; resolution and recovery.’ Key to this management is ‘effective risk 
management and appropriate deployment of police … as well as ensuring accurate 
recording and classification.’38 It is very clear that reports which fall into the National 
Incident Category List (NICL) are on a wide spectrum of seriousness, including those 
incidents which are ‘a minor annoyance’ to the individual reporting, to road traffic 
incidents resulting in death or injury.39 The NSIR states clearly that a report of an NICL 
 
34 ibid, para [281]. 
35 National Policing Improvement Agency, The National Standard for Incident Recording (Home Office 
2011), 3.  
36 ibid, 4. 
37 ibid, 3. 
38 ibid, 4. 
39 As set out in Chapter 2 of NSIR, which includes three key categories including Transport, Anti-Social 
Behaviour, and Public Safety and Welfare. The types of incidents which might usually be reported by 
victims of non-crime hate incidents might, for example, fall within the second of these categories. The Anti-
Social Behaviour category is is sub-divided into three categories: Personal, Nuisance, and Environmental. 
The first of these categories, the document states can range on a spectrum from ‘a minor annoyance’ to ‘risk 
incident ‘will usually be recorded regardless of whether a deployment is or is not 
required.’40 However, the recording of an incident will not necessarily create a ‘lengthy 
incident record.’41 The response to an incident should be guided by three considerations, 
NSIR states: (1) What can go wrong; (2) How likely is it; (3) What are the consequences.42 
Incidents can have qualifiers, which are intended to ‘add value’ by capturing aspects of 
the incident, which might, NSIR states, ‘influence the overall response to an incident’.43 
The tweets, constituting at the very least, a ‘minor annoyance’ were clearly a non-crime 
incident for the purposes of NSIR. Whether as a matter of fact the behaviour of the police 
fell within or outside these guidelines would be a matter for the Court to determine, but 
it seems that, quite apart from the operation of HCOG, the NSIR fully permits, and indeed 
requires, the recording and investigation of very low level incidents. 
 
Leaving aside the validity of the NSIR, a third further complicating factor to this case is 
the fact that the Court considered the issue through the lens of the Malicious 
Communications Act 1998 and the Communications Act 2003. Knowles J took exception 
to any suggestion that Mrs B was a victim of Miller. However, viewing the incidents 
through the lens of an incitement offence such as stirring up hatred might be more 
appropriate here given the facts, which would also remove the requirement for there to 
be a direct victim. Further, there is no requirement to name or predict the eventual crime 
which might be committed in the context of escalation in this context. Thus, rather than 
focusing the case as the Court did on the Malicious Communications Act 1998 or the 
Communications Act 200344, it might more usefully have considered the statements by 
Miller in the context of incitement to hatred legislation. Further, Knowles J was very clear 
– and indeed laboured the point – that the tweets in question were not ‘directed at [Mrs 
B] or the transgender community’45 which makes one wonder if he thought it was ever 
possible to direct tweets at a community as a whole. Framing the tweets outside the 1998 
and 2003 Acts  would have meant that this issue would not have concerned Knowles J as 
 
of harm, deterioration of health and disruption of mental or emotional well-being.’ National Policing 
Improvement Agency, The National Standard for Incident Recording (Home Office 2011), 14. 
40 National Policing Improvement Agency, The National Standard for Incident Recording (Home Office 
2011), 4. 
41 ibid, 4. 
42 ibid, 3. 
43 ibid, 6. 
44 Indeed, the Court goes into an analysis of the two pieces of legislation at some length to support the 
conclusion that ‘the suggestion that there was evidence that Claimant could escalate so as to commit either 
offence is not remotely untenable’, a conclusion which seems to indicate that Knowles J can predict the 
future. However, he looks at the content of the existing tweets and their compliance with the legislation to 
determine potential escalation which rather misses the point. For example, in considering the relevance of 
section 127 of the Communications Act, Knowles J notes that there was no evidence that anyone was 
‘remotely concerned’ by the tweets, rather than applying the objective test required by Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Collins [2006] 1 WLR 2223 which requires the court to apply ‘the standards of an open and 
just multiracial society and taking account of the context and all relevant circumstances to determine as a 
question of fact whether a message was grossly offensive.’ [2020] EWHC 225, para [269]. Rather than 
applying the standards of an open and just multiracial society, I would suggest the standards of an open 
and just gender inclusive society. By definition, because the offence was recorded as a non-crime hate 
incident, the police were de facto of the view that they did not amount to an offence under that legislation.  
45 [2020] EWHC 225, para [78] 
it did. Even if the 1998 and 2003 Acts were correctly applied, at least one tweet dead 
named an English person, and thus Mrs B might well have been considered as reporting 
a hate incident as a witness, and not a victim. 
 
Indeed, the Court goes into an analysis of the two pieces of legislation at some length to 
support the conclusion that ‘the suggestion that there was evidence that Claimant could 
escalate so as to commit either offence is not remotely untenable’. However, he looks at 
the content of the existing tweets and their compliance with the legislation to determine 
potential escalation which rather misses the point. For example, in considering the 
relevance of section 127 of the Communications Act, Knowles J notes that there was no 
evidence that anyone was ‘remotely concerned’ by the tweets, rather than applying the 
objective test required by Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins46 which requires the 
court to apply ‘the standards of an open and just multiracial society and taking account 
of the context and all relevant circumstances to determine as a question of fact whether 
a message was grossly offensive.’47 Rather than applying the standards of an open and 
just multiracial society, I would suggest the standards of an open and just gender 
inclusive society. By definition, because the offence was recorded as a non-crime hate 
incident, the police were de facto of the view that they did not amount to an offence under 
that legislation. 
 
Further, the Court goes into an analysis of the two pieces of legislation at some length to 
support the conclusion that ‘the suggestion that there was evidence that Claimant could 
escalate so as to commit either offence is not remotely untenable’, a conclusion which 
seems unsupported by the analysis which follows. In that analysis, Knowles J looks at the 
content of the existing tweets and their compliance with the legislation to determine 
potential escalation which, I believe, rather misses the point. For example, in considering 
the relevance of section 127 of the Communications Act, Knowles J notes that there was 
no evidence that anyone was ‘remotely concerned’ by the tweets, though he did not refer 
to any Twitter metadata or replies to support this statement. Further, the Court did not 
apply the objective test required by Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins48 in applying 
section 127 which requires the court to apply ‘the standards of an open and just 
multiracial society and taking account of the context and all relevant circumstances to 
determine as a question of fact whether a message was grossly offensive.’49 I would 
suggest that in this context, and adapting Collins, the standard of an ‘open and just gender 
inclusive society’ should be applied in cases such as this. By definition, because the 
offence was recorded as a non-crime hate incident, the police were de facto of the view 
that the tweets did not amount to an offence under that legislation. Thus, the question is 
not whether the incident itself fell within the boundaries of an offence, but rather whether 
the incident required further investigation under NSIR. 
 
46 [2006] 1 WLR 2223 
47 [2020] EWHC 225, para [269] 
48 [2006] 1 WLR 2223 
49 [2020] EWHC 225, para [269] 
 
The final and most concerning aspect of the judgment is Knowles J’s examination of the 
context of the tweets. In considering the actions of the police, Knowles J emphasised the 
context of the tweets within what he described as ‘an ongoing debate that is complex and 
multifaceted.’50 Indeed, he dedicates nearly three pages of his judgment to rehearsing the 
position of those with so-called ‘gender-critical’ views and their concerns regarding the 
stifling of free speech. He does not, however, consider the rights of the trans community 
to be protected from transphobic attacks at any point in his decision, or explore what the 
standards of an ‘open and just society’ might be in the context of trans people. He accepted 
as a fact evidence that ‘some involved in the debate are readily willing to label those with 
different viewpoints as “transphobic” or as displaying “hatred” when they are not.’51 I 
would respectfully disagree. Simply because those from the majority population have 
strongly felt beliefs in relation to a minority population does not make that position valid, 
or any less ‘phobic’. It is not the role of the dominant group to determine what is or is not 
experienced as harmful or hostile by the targeted minority. To argue that that is the case 
is equivalent to suggesting that white people commenting on Black lives have ownership 
over determining what is and is not racist.  Similar arguments have been, and still are, 
made in relation to the validity of homosexuality. Indeed, the fact that legislation has been 
introduced or is being considered in a number of jurisdictions to ban so-called conversion 
therapy is evidence of this. Although there are people who still hold these views, it is 
clearly accepted that the views themselves, which question the legitimacy of 
homosexuality as a sexual orientation, are homophobic. In the same way, I believe, 
arguments that trans people’s gender identities are not legitimate are transphobic. 
However, the Court was of the view that:  
 
‘It is clear that there are those on one side of the debate who simply will not 
tolerate different views, even when they are expressed by legitimate scholars 
whose views are not grounded in hatred, bigotry, prejudice or hostility, but are 
based on legitimately different value judgments, reasoning and analysis, and form 
part of mainstream academic research.’52 
 
To state that transphobic views are acceptable because they are held and reproduced by 
as many as 100 academics employed at universities places an unusually high level of trust 
in those individuals’ perspectives, particularly in the absence of any cited scholarly 
research to support those positions. It should also be noted that the concerns expressed 
by the vast majority of those who share the views quoted extensively in the judgment of 
the Court are not born out by research or experience in other jurisdictions where a 
system of self-identification is in place. For example, there is no evidence that cis women 
have had their rights eroded or their safety compromised by trans women in Ireland in 
 
50 ibid, para [241]. 
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the five years since gender recognition legislation was introduced. This line of reasoning, 
if upheld, has huge significance for the protection of the trans community in the UK.  
 
Finally, of most concern is the acceptance by the Court of the argument made by counsel 
for Miller that gender critical speech – that is, speech which questions the rights and very 
legitimacy of trans people – is specially protected under Article 10. Special protection is 
afforded under Article 10 to ‘political speech and debate on questions of public interest’ 
as per Vajnai v Hungary.53 The Court held that ‘debates’ concerning a ‘topic of current 
controversy, namely gender recognition’ have special protection under Article 10. I 
respectfully but firmly and unequivocally disagree. There are, of course, degrees of 
hateful speech, which at one end of the spectrum is protected and at the other end is not. 
However, it is a separate matter to treat speech about a particular category of persons as 
deserving of special protection. If existing gender recognition legislation allows for the 
recognition of trans identities, I see no reason as to how the legitimacy of trans identities 
can be subject to specially protected debate. Transphobic speech should have no more or 
less protection under Article 10 than racist, homophobic, Islamophobic, antisemitic, or 
disablist speech. The statement by the Court that racist language is always hateful and 
offensive, whereas ‘expressions often described as transphobic are not in fact so’ is 
deeply concerning. It portrays a particular perspective on trans rights on the part of 
Knowles J which is not shared by the trans community, their allies, or those advocating 
for trans rights. In this, I echo the statement of Panti Bliss from her infamous Noble Call 
at the Abbey Theatre: 
 
‘And so now Irish gay people, we find ourselves in this ludicrous situation where 
not only are we not allowed to say publicly what we feel oppressed by, we’re not 
even allowed to think it, because the very definition, our definition, has been 
disallowed by our betters. And for the last three weeks, I have been denounced 
from the floor of the Oireachtas to newspaper columns to the seething morass of 
internet commentary, denounced for using hate speech because I dared to use the 
word homophobia. And a jumped up queer like me should know that the very 
word homophobia is no longer available to gay people. Which is a spectacular and 
neat Orwellian trick because now it turns out that gay people are not the victims 
of homophobia, homophobes are the victims of homophobia.’54 
 
This position is echoed in the judgment of Knowles J when he questions whether Mrs B 
was correct to consider whether the tweets were transphobic: 
 
‘Professor Stock’s evidence demonstrates how quickly some involved in the 
transgender debate are prepared to accuse others with whom they disagree of 
 
53 8 July 2008, No 33629/06. Adopted in domestic law in R (ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting 
Corporation [2004] 1 ACT 185. 
54 See, Panti Bliss (aka Rory O’Neill), Panti’s Noble Call at the Abbey Theatre available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXayhUzWnl0  
showing hatred, or as being transphobic when they are not, but simply hold a 
different view. Mrs B’s evidence would tend to confirm Professor Stock’s 
evidence.’55 
 
Of course, there are legislative standards in this regard, under, for example, section 146 
of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which provides for the aggravation of a sentence where 
the crime is motivated by hostility towards persons who are transgender. But where 
HCOG definitively and expressly provides that the perception of the victim is what 
determines whether a non-crime hate incident is or is not transphobic, it is not the place 
for anyone – even the Court – to question that perception.  
 
Rather than focus on Article 10 rights, counsel and the Court might well have considered 
other Convention rights, and particularly the due process rights of Miller protected under 
Article 6 of the Convention, as well as his right to a good name, protected under Article 8 
of the Convention. In this regard, in my view the question as to whether the incident was 
included on Mr Miller’s Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate is key: in fact the court 
never made a definitive finding of fact on this issue which is unfortunate. The Court could 
also have compared the recording of non-crime hate incidents under HCOG to the 
recording of non-crime incidents under NSIR. In this analysis (and presuming NSIR would 
withstand scrutiny), the issues might have been clearer. Including a requirement of 
rationality to the perception test, before a non-crime hate incident can be recorded, has 
the capacity to set back decades of policing practice which sought to address institutional 
bias on the part of police officers by introducing the perception test.  
 
Finally, throughout the judgment, the court dead-names individuals and uses terms 
which display – at best – ignorance, such as ‘the abuse were based on hostility because of 
transgender.’56 Indeed, the Court explicitly refuses to acknowledge the operation of the 
Gender Recognition Act 2004 in the statement:  
 
‘Where [the words man or woman], or related words, are used in this judgment, I 
am referring to individuals whose biological sex is as determined by their 
chromosomes, irrespective of the gender with which they identify. This use of 
language is not intended in any way to diminish the views and experience of those 
who identify as female notwithstanding that their biological sex is male (and vice 
versa), or to call their rights into question.’57  
 
Thus, aside from the legal precedent, I believe the judgment of the court in this case is 
clear evidence for the need for judicial training in the area of gender identity, gender 
identity, and sex characteristics, so as to avoid such inappropriate statements in the 
future. 
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Conclusion 
As far as I understand it, Miller has been granted leave to appeal the decision of Knowles 
J with reference to HCOG to the Supreme Court. This should be welcomed, as clarification 
on the range of issues which arose in the case is required. If this permission is not granted, 
the finding of the Court might be viewed as narrowly only applying to discussions 
regarding the trans community and their right to gender recognition, as opposed to 
applying across all protected groups, thus creating a hierarchy of victims in policing 
practice. This, I would argue, would be a deeply concerning and dangerous precedent. 
Moreover, by exceptionalising transphobic hate speech in the way that the Court did, 
creating a class of speech with respect to a minority community which is treated 
differently to speech in relation to other minority communities, is deeply concerning. 
 
 
 
 
